The trend is becoming clearer: the EU is entering its 'rearmament era'.
On Thursday, March 6th, just hours after US President Donald Trump froze military aid to Ukraine, Ursula von der Leyen announced the ReArm Europe Plan. During a special meeting of EU leaders in Brussels, the 27 heads of state and government discussed the five-point response plan, named REARM Europe/Readiness 2030, proposed by the European Commission on Tuesday, March 4th. As the name suggests, the goal of the plan is a significant expansion of Europe's military capabilities.
In her speech, Von der Leyen justifies the necessity of this initiative both with the short term goal of supporting Ukraine, and the long term goal to ensure the continent's strategic autonomy. Indeed, as Trump's repeated threats to refuse defense of fellow NATO members are no longer mere speculation, we can no longer afford to dismiss them.
BUT WHERE WILL WE FIND THE MONEY TO ARM THE ENTIRE EU?
The numbers are in, and they are staggering: €800 billion is the amount Member States aim to mobilise under 5 years to finance a massive ramp-up of defense spending. Even at the EU level, this is an enormous sum, so how could we reach a budget that would go toe-to-toe with the USA's?
To help member states meet the targets, von der Leyen has given the green light to unlock public funds. The proposal activates the Stability and Growth Pact's escape clause to increase defense spending by €650 billion over four years. It also launches a €150 billion SAFE loan for defense investments, and expands European Investment Bank funding for defense, leveraging private capital.
This move is unprecedented and calls for a brief explanation: EU member states are bound by strict economic and financial constraints set by the 'Stability and Growth Pact’. These rules, established by the EU Commission, ensure that national finances remain stable, preventing excessive public deficits and debt levels.
These limits are very rarely suspended, as economic and financial stability is a fundamental prerequisite for EU membership. However, in the case of the rearmament, it seems that the EU is willing to turn a blind eye, perhaps even both, allowing countries to activate the national escape clause and, therefore, exceed these budgetary constraints.
In fact, closing the second eye might soon become necessary, as even these funds may not be sufficient to finance the rearmament effort. De facto, the plan also includes the eventual possibility to utilize, on a voluntary basis and with limitations, the Cohesion Funds — yes, the European fund designed to support underdeveloped regions and promote sustainable development!
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT BEHIND THE EUROPEAN REARMAMENT: WHO IS BENEFITING?
In von der Leyen's speech of the 18th of March, there was a clear reference to the Russian threat, as the country “is on an irreversible path to creating a pure war economy.”
Indeed about 7% of Russia's GDP is spent on defense. However, can we truly believe that allocating 1.5% of all the 27 EU Member States’ GDPs to the defense industry, and branding it with an EU slogan would shield us from acknowledging that we, too, are increasingly giving in to the anachronistic charm of war-economy?
The specter of an arms race in Europe has been looming over the Old Continent for a long time — it didn’t come out of nowhere. The lobbying efforts behind it have been constant: since 2014, the 10 largest European defense companies have held hundreds of meetings with the European Commission, and the EU has begun taking notes.
Some of the most recent initiatives include the establishment in 2019 of DG DEFIS (Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space), a move that underscored Europe’s growing reliance on its defense industry. Moreover,in the same year, financial instruments such as the European Defence Fund and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production were created to support defense initiatives.
Remaining on the industrial side, von der Leyen seems to keep companies’ interests very close to her heart. She has recently emphasised how, at the movement, the European military industry is "too fragmented" to produce the equipment at the pace and scale required by member states. "We really need to turn the tide. It starts with investment in Europe. As we all know, today the majority of defence investment goes outside Europe. (...) This is not sustainable. We must buy more European. (...) We will set up a European Military Sales Mechanism to help make this happen”, she said.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A EUROPEAN ARMY, WHAT IS REAL AND WHAT IS SMOKE?
We have the money, we have the justifications, thus the question to answer is the following: is it actually possible? The idea of a common European army has been discussed continuously since the European project began post WWII, and it makes a special appearance every couple of years when the role of EU in defense is brought up: German defense analyst, Ulrike Franke, aptly described the EU army as the “ghost in the system of the European Defense debates”.
On the more technical side, for a true European army to exist, the EU would need to transform into a federal state with full control over foreign policy and the armed forces. Many Member States, however, have zero appetite for such a project.
We are then left with the idea of a hybrid force, a European Army that complements national defense forces without replacing them. The backbone of Europe’s defense would still primarily rely on major national militaries: France, Poland, Germany, and, if it chooses, the United Kingdom. The EU could establish a standing common force, one that doesn’t belong to any single nation but is collectively owned and operated by the European Union. This force could be around 100,000 soldiers strong, effectively replacing the 100,000 U.S. troops currently stationed across the continent.
However, a few challenges remain. For instance, not all 27 EU member states are enthusiastic about an EU military force. It is likely that countries like Hungary and Slovakia would veto such a project. Moreover, the EU would have to create an integrated EU command that works alongside NATO without duplicating efforts. And last but not least, decision making could pose a challenge. Who decides when and where EU forces are deployed? The European Council could potentially take on this role.
The idea of a ‘coalition of the willing’ might be the most practical solution: a group of countries voluntarily moving forward with deeper military cooperation, similar to the Schengen Area or the Eurozone.
THE END OF HISTORY, THE RISE OF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
The term "The End of History" was popularized by political scientist Francis Fukuyama in the 1990s. He predicted that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the world had reached its ideological endpoint with the triumph of Western liberal democracy, emerging as the final form of human government, and with the United States as its main champion. However, the end of history has now reached a crisis: the book was never really over, and it is possible that neither was its chapter on the Cold War.
The "Cold War Never Ended" theory steer the focus back on the fact that the geopolitical and ideological tensions between major powers, particularly the United States and Russia, have persisted despite the formal end of the Cold War in 1991. It aims to remind us that the Cold War was not merely about ideological confrontation but also about global hegemony. While the Soviet Union ceased to compete for worldwide dominance, Russia has continued to focus on regional concerns, particularly along its bordering nations. This theory backs up its stance by mentioning the survival to our days of Cold War institutions, like NATO, and the lack of a new security architecture inclusive of Russia.
We failed to put an end to this story by neglecting to exhaust all possible scenarios in which NATO and nuclear arsenals could be employed: this is how we enabled the spirit of Cold War competitiveness to remain dormant, only to resurface most visibly in the Ukraine-Russia war. The ideological clash between democracy and authoritarianism has emerged, once again, as a central theme in current international relations.
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEFENSE STRATEGY
We've always been taught that large-scale international rearmament almost inevitably leads to war — one of the most recognizable domino effects in history. From there, all it takes is a single push, which can come from anywhere. But could it be that, this time, the sequence is reversed?
We've already experienced the push — more than one, in fact. Trump’s wavering commitment to NATO’s Article 5, coupled with mounting geopolitical tensions at Europe’s borders — not just in Ukraine, but also in Turkey — have put the proposal of an EU army back onto the table. This comes at a time when many Europeans had believed themselves permanently shielded from war after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
In this context, the shift toward rearmament is not just a reaction to external threats but a stark acknowledgment that Europe's security now rests, to a significant degree, in its own hands. Long regarded as a bastion of diplomacy and economic power, the EU has historically struggled to align its defense capabilities with its political ambitions.
Is that about to change? One thing is certain: history keeps writing itself.
