The German coalition government has collapsed after Chancellor Scholz's decision to sack Finance Minister Lindner. The Chancellor has requested a confidence vote for next January, but the opposition is demanding snap elections. This would be the nail in the coffin for the ruling ‘traffic light’ (die Ampel) coalition, made up of Social Democrats (SPD, in red), Liberals (FDP, in yellow), and Greens, creating an opportunity for new parties to establish themselves in the political mainstream. For example, Alternative für Deutschland, Germany’s new far-right party, has shockingly won the state election in Thuringia and coming in as a close second in Saxony and Brandenburg, both part of the former Eastern Germany, also known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Another surprise was the far-left party Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), which finished third in all three states. The Ampel has suffered a heavy defeat and was overtaken by the Christian Democrats (CDU), who won the elections in Saxony. A somewhat positive note comes from Brandenburg, where the SPD has maintained its stronghold, while AfD and BSW climbed to the second and third spots respectively. Despite being on the opposite side of the political spectrum, AfD and BSW overlap on anti-immigration and pro-Russian discourse. Considering the ongoing political chaos and snap federal elections approaching, what has caused Germany’s rise in conservatism and extremism?
The main reason could be found in the Ampel coalition’s infighting. The shutdown of nuclear plants and the start of the Ukraine War has sparked an energy crisis. The Greens were firm on their anti-nuclear stance and claimed to have given enough concessions, while the FDP Liberals called for an extension of Germany’s nuclear plants’ usage, as they warned of significant economic damages. The SPD of Chancellor Scholz had the uneasy task of reconciling its allies while the cost of living crisis worsened. In the end, after an extension, Germany’s last three nuclear plants were shut down in 2023. Another point of controversy was immigration. Popular dissatisfaction has been exacerbated by the knife attack which killed three people in Solingen. This incident symbolises a federal-wide rising wave of violence, with stabbings occurring especially at train stations. In response, the Ampel is trying to tackle illegal immigration, but the CDU is refusing to support the coalition ahead of the elections. Finally, the coalition has collapsed following FDP Finance Minister Lindner's drafting of a report suggesting to cut spending. This has caused the furious reaction of the SPD Chancellor Scholz, who has taken the decision to let Lindner go. In face of these shortcomings, the AfD and BSW find fertile ground to fuel anti-establishment sentiment.
Looking at these parties’ origins, the AfD was founded in 2013 near Frankfurt to counter the existence of the Euro and the EU as a whole. After some initial success in the former East Germany, the AfD succeeded in obtaining federal seats in 2017. The key figures of this party are party leader Bjorn Hocke and Chancellor candidate Alice Weidel. Adding to past controversies regarding antisemitism, the AfD has also caught the eye of Germany's Constitutional Court since 2021, leading to investigations for prohibited far-right extremism. As for the BSW, it was founded this January in Berlin as a breakaway branch of the German Left and has quickly gained consensus thanks to its ‘leftist conservatism’. In fact, this new political force joins economic progressivism with a more cautious approach to social issues. Here, the key individual is Sahra Wagenknecht, who gives the party its name.
Both parties post about three main issues: immigration, Ukraine, and euroscepticism. First, the AfD attacks immigrants’ violence, calling for mass expulsions; while BSW claims refugees are overburdening Germany’s welfare system. In a survey, 60% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with Germany’s immigration policy, claiming the system has reached its full capacity and fearing social conflict. Second, the AfD demands a halt to payments to Ukraine in response to its involvement in the destruction of Nord Stream II pipeline, while BSW sees the use of German weapons on Russian territory as leading to an escalation. This somewhat resonates with popular demand, as most people agree not enough effort has been put towards reaching an agreement, whereas public opinion is split over economic and military support for Kyiv.
Finally, the AfD sees the EU as sabotaging the German car industry with the excuse of climate change, while the BSW accuses Brussels of exploiting taxpayers to accelerate Ukrainian membership. While a slim majority agrees with Ukrainian accession, the car industry is at the heart of heated debate. The EU is trying to counter the flooding of cheap Chinese electric vehicles in its markets, and Volkswagen has announced an unprecedented closure of German factories due to rising costs. Fearing a trade war with Beijing, BMW has urged Germany to vote against the proposal for additional tariffs on Chinese vehicles. The call has been heard by Berlin, but tariffs are set to be implemented nonetheless, weakening many Germans’ work security. It is curious to note how features of former and upcoming US president Donald Trump’s political discourse are finding emulators in the heart of Europe. The latter put emphasis on social media to spread his impoverished and inflammatory discourse to dissatisfied masses. This reflects academia’s warning of Instagram’s radicalising capabilities, with the AfD becoming the most popular party among young Germans, and traditional media forced to report their controversies. This has cost the parties accusations of populism and russophilia, as the parties’ nostalgic appeal stems from left-behind Eastern Germany. Taking into consideration the federal-wide struggles Berlin is facing, why are these parties so successful in the former East Germany?
Despite improvements, the former GDR is still economically lagging behind the West, as the shutdown of former state-subsidised firms has led to mass unemployment and emigration. This has fuelled dissatisfaction, and authoritarian tendencies linked to the East’s communist past. In a survey carried out by the University of Leipzig, half of respondents declared to be unsatisfied with democracy, and a third agreed on the need for authoritarian rule. 70% of respondents believe immigrants are a burden to the welfare state, and 50% call for an immigration ban for Muslims. Moreover, a third of respondents claim Jewish people have too much influence in politics. These extremist standpoints are seen as caused by the communist past and post-reunification poverty, as unemployment and migration to the West skyrocketed. This led to a loss of trust in mainstream politics and, for a quarter of respondents, a reevaluation of the Nazi past. This can explain why AfD and BSW are gaining nation-wide consensus, reaching respectively 15,9% and 6,2% in the 2023 European elections. Moreover, the return of anti-immigration sentiment could mean the end of Germany’s cosmopolitan parenthesis, as Berlin had embraced diversity only since the 2000s by giving citizenship to second-generation immigrants. However, former Chancellor Angela Merkel admitted in 2010 that her country’s attempt to embrace multiculturalism had failed. Merkel tried to revitalise the project during the 2015 refugee crisis under the slogan ‘wir schaffen das!’ (we can do it), with mixed results. Some refugees are struggling to integrate, immigration-related costs have skyrocketed, and far-right discourse has entered the mainstream, dividing Germany and Europe. However, the latter is at a crossroads, as a petition to ban the AfD has officially entered Parliament. Nonetheless, a positive judgement from Germany’s Constitutional Court is far from certain. To issue a ban, the party would have to be declared anti-constitutional. This would be possible under two criteria: first, the party should be declared capable of undermining or abolishing Germany’s democratic order or compromising the existence of the Federal Republic as a whole. Second, the party should also be found capable of achieving its anti-democratic aims. In sum, the shocking results in Eastern Germany have cemented AfD and BSW status as new political forces, weakening mainstream parties. The turn to conservatism may be seen as the end of Germany’s openness, but we shall not normalise the presence of certified extremist parties. With the snap federal elections approaching and a constitutional judgement pending, we are left to wonder whether East German dissatisfaction will spill over to the West and potentially jeopardise democracy.
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